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Loan Loss Provisioning in the Commercial Banking System 
of Barbados: Practices and Determinants 
 
 
Roland Craigwell and Wayne Elliott 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the process of loan loss provisioning within the 
commercial banking system of Barbados. It uses questionnaires and interviews to ascertain how 
banks set their provisional standards and levels. In addition, the results from this approach 
reveal, for the first time in Barbados, the individual banks‟ procedures for loan loss provisioning. 
An evaluation of the impact of macroeconomic and bank specific factors on commercial banks‟ 
provisions utilising panel dynamic ordinary least squares is also undertaken. Both sets of factors 
are found to influence the level of provisions. In particular, loan loss provisions are heavily 
dependent upon the performance of the real economy and competition in international markets is 
shown to have serious implications for the banking sector in both the short and long run. 
Moreover, this study asserts that larger banks in Barbados are better able to screen loans and 
avoid defaults. 
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Introduction 
A loan loss provision is a charge to commercial banks‟ profit and loss statements that creates a 
reserve on their balance sheets.  It can be viewed as a cushioning mechanism which may ensure 
that banks do not unexpectedly lose their entire outstanding loan balances. Without this 
adjustment, the amount of loans and advances on the balance sheets of banks would include 
possible future losses. Furthermore, regulators, creditors and investors could be misled by 
overstated capital figures.   
 
One of the major consequences pertaining to the financial crisis of 2007 is to raise concerns 
about the need for closer control and supervision on lending institutions. In Barbados, the Central 
Bank has started to review the regulatory framework of these activities with the goal of 
minimising the adverse effects of future crises. International regulators (International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements) have suggested several reforms, 
and programs aimed at strengthening the international banking and financial system. One key 
element of these reforms highlighted by the regulators is to assess the process of loan loss 
provisioning. 
 
Given the above, this study evaluates the loan loss provisioning process of the banking system of 
the small open economy of Barbados. It is the first of its kind to be undertaken on this country 
and possibly, on the wider Caribbean. Two methodologies are used: interviews with the main 
objective of ascertaining how banks provide for loan losses, and an econometric model which 
will explore the main factors driving the level of provisions.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 gives some background information on loan 
loss provisions.  Section 3 presents the methodologies while section 4 describes the results 
derived from employing the various methods. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the 
findings, including limitations and policy implications. 
 
2. Background 
On account of many different factors, the principle and interest that banks agree upon with their 
creditors are not always collected. As a result, they have to apply a technique to soften the 
impact of such losses: loan loss provisioning. To make the provisioning process consistent across 
different jurisdictions, banks use many different means, of which a major one is utilising loan 
loss provisioning standards.  
 
2.1 Loan Loss Provisioning Standards 
The Basel 1 Capital Accord was released in 1988 seeking to create a competitive international 
banking system by strengthening its stability and setting up fair and consistent standards. It 
consists of three mutually reinforcing pillars - minimum capital requirements, the supervisory 
review process and market discipline - which together contribute to the safety and soundness of 
the financial system.  
 
The Basel Committee (1999) emphasizes that there are no uniformed loan classifications, nor is 
there a standard procedure to assess loan risk across all jurisdictions. It further posits that several 
concepts of loan loss provisioning are susceptible to different interpretations.  To deal with these 
problems, diverse systems are utilised in different countries (Laurin and Majnoni, 2003). Also, 
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there was a move to introduce more suitable standards, for example, The International 
Accounting Standards (IAS), to resolve some of these issues. According to Laurin and Majnoni 
(2003) these standards are yet to give detailed guidance for loan loss provisioning. Due to the 
shortcomings of these accounting standards, countries that implement the IAS still have different 
loan loss provisioning regulatory frameworks. For instance, sometimes banks need to apply more 
complex internal classification systems, while more standardised systems are required by bank 
regulators for reporting purposes. 
 
In concurrence, the Central Bank of Barbados, as a regulator, uses the Financial Institutions Act 
1998 which is an adaptation of Basel Accord 1. Prior to the current Act, financial institutions 
were governed by the Financial Intermediaries Regulatory Act (1992) which was predated by the 
Banking Act (1978).  The Financial Institutions Act (1998) governs all financial institutions in 
Barbados. It is the benchmark for loan loss provisioning regardless of the standards the 
individual commercial banks choose to employ. When reporting to the Central Bank of 
Barbados, banks must ensure that all information concerning loan loss provisioning is in 
accordance with the Financial Institutions Act 1998.  However, the flexibility given to 
commercial banks through their classification processes, limits the use of penalties and sanctions 
that could be utilized to regulate inappropriate classification and provisioning (Laurin and 
Majnoni, 2003). Regulators therefore rely mainly on moral suasion and the threat of sanctions 
rather than specific penalties to enforce the regulations.  
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2.2 Classification Criteria 
The provisioning criteria employed to estimate losses in the loan portfolio are one of the key 
ways to assess the adequacy of loan loss provisioning levels and reserves. An inaccurate 
classification of individual loans destabilizes the process of provisioning, which, in turn, distorts 
the figures on the balance sheet and overstate capital and capital ratios (Angklomkliew et al, 
2009). In support of this view, Song (2002) adds that there ought to be one set of well-known 
rules governing the provisioning process. He states that the classification of outstanding loans 
should be based on a comprehensive assessment of whether or not the borrower is able to service 
the debt, rather than on the outstanding loan value or the collateral provided. The Basel 
Committee (1999) supports this viewpoint but also believes that the current value of collateral 
and the ability to realize this value should be included with other criteria that banks deem 
necessary. 
 
The main method of classifying loans is by the time that has elapsed since the last payment was 
due. The longer the time past the last due date, the less likely it is for commercial banks to 
recover the entire balance and the greater the banks‟ provision for the outstanding balance. This 
procedure is used mainly as a trigger, after which further evaluation is undertaken. Relying only 
on the „time past the due date‟ approach would cause losses to be recognized later in the loan 
analysis rather than earlier. 
 
Many countries have become aware of the inefficiencies of the „time past due‟ methodology and 
agree that more forward-looking criteria - borrower‟s cash flow and repayment capacity - should 
be taken into account. Consequently, some commercial banks now look at the borrower‟s 
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behavior as a proxy for their willingness to repay a loan. An example of this is a case where a 
borrower misses a few payments, the commercial bank contacts him but he gives no suitable 
reason for his delinquency. This indicates that a default may be in the near future and that a 
provision should be made. 
 
Another major difference in loan loss provisioning practices across jurisdictions, as pointed out 
by Cortavarria et al (2000), is the classification of restructured loans. Restructured loans are 
loans that have been modified to better ensure the loan balance is recovered. In the Czech 
Republic, for instance, bankers may characterize restructured loans as substandard while in 
Thailand they may be placed in the „special mention‟ or pass category. However, the 
reclassifications of the restructured loans may not be implemented immediately but may be 
undertaken over a period of time when bankers are satisfied that borrowers are meeting the terms 
of the new contracts. Bearing this in mind, credit analysts should ensure that restructuring is 
based on sound underwriting standards because the cost to recover collateral is time sensitive. In 
other words, if the collateral was collected early, and the option of restructuring not issued, then 
the bank may have recovered more of the outstanding loan balance (Cortavarria et al, 2000). 
 
Just as there are different ways to characterize loans and various categories for loans to be 
classified into, there are several types of loan loss provisions. The type of provisioning in one 
economic community may not be suitable in another. 
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2.3 Types of Loan Loss Provisioning 
Balla and Mckenna (2009) highlight two broad categories of loan loss provisioning: the dynamic 
loan loss provisioning procedure and the traditional incurred loss method.  Dynamic provisioning 
is a statistical method that utilizes the historical data of various asset classes. It determines the 
event driven provisioning periodically. It is a deliberate way to construct the loan loss reserve in 
good economic times. The built up reserve then eases pressures on earnings and capital by 
absorbing loan losses during an economic downturn. Conversely, the incurred loss method 
delays provisioning until the economy fails to grow; it may magnify the bust because most bad 
loans will only reveal themselves during recessions.  In essence, the key difference between the 
two categories of loan loss provisioning is not the level of provisioning but its timing (Balla and 
Mckenna, 2009). 
 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2006) also distinguished between non-discretionary and discretionary 
loan loss provisioning. The non-discretionary component is designed to cover expected loan 
losses in the banks‟ loan portfolio. The authors state that this component drives the cyclicality of 
loan loss provisioning and it leads to a misevaluation of expected credit losses. The discretionary 
component is caused by management‟s use of loan loss provisioning for its own objectives. 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2006) give at least three functions for which banks‟ management utilises 
loan loss provisioning (see also Bikker and Metzemakers, 2002). The first function is the practice 
of earnings management where banks reserve more in good years to cover for bad years. This 
effectively raises and lowers income, and by extension, profits and dividends, as desired. The 
second is the management of the capital ratio which is possible on account of loan loss 
provisions being a part of the regulatory capital depending on the stipulations of the territory. 
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The third function is tax evasion and this is common because provisions are tax deductible in 
most countries. 
 
In addition, Bikker and Metzemakers (2002) argue that the propensity to use discretionary loan 
loss provisioning to smooth income is greater for banks with good performance relative to banks 
with moderate performance. The authors concluded that, during upswing phases, weak specific 
provisions encourage the expansion of credit. With sudden downturns, the identification of 
problem loans constrains the banks to make provisions, thereby reducing their ability to provide 
new credit. Poorly capitalized banks appear more restricted by provisioning. Dziobek et al 
(2000) also suggest that, if loan loss provisions count as regulatory capital and are tax deductible, 
management has a greater incentive to use loan loss provisions which should lower the tax 
burden. Loan loss provisions could also inadvertently signal financial strength. A bank‟s level of 
loan loss provisions and reserves may indicate that it is strong enough to withstand a financial 
blow to the loan portfolio. 
 
Using the theoretical model by Cavallo and Majnono (2002), Bikker and Metzemakers (2002) 
examined balance sheet data of 29 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries and found that banks that hold a greater amount of risky loans act somewhat 
prudently and provision more. There was also evidence in support of the capital management 
hypothesis that banks lend more when their capital ratios are low. In addition, it emerged that 
provisions depend strongly on credit risk. In harmony with most previous authors (for example, 
see Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Floro, 2010; Jiménez and Saurina, 2006; Wezel, 2010), the 
evidence confirmed that provisions depend significantly on the business cycle. However, Bikker 
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and Metzemakers (2002) could not support the hypothesis that an expansion in provisioning 
during successive years of economic boom resulted in higher reserves after the year of recession. 
There was also no evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the erosion of reserves after years of 
consecutive recession was due to increased provisioning in years of economic boom. 
 
2.4 How much to Provide for Loan Losses?  
Another key question that needs to be answered in order to complete the provisioning process is 
how much to provide for each category of loans. As described by the Financial Institutions Act 
1998, following the annual review of the loan portfolio, each loan classification category should 
be assigned minimum levels of provisions.  As a result, the substandard, doubtful and loss 
categories are considered as classified debt and are provided for whilst pass, special Mention and 
mortgages (up to six months) are not. Therefore, reserves are comprised of the provisions on 
total categorical classified debt; 10% for the total substandard loans value, 50% for total doubtful 
and 100% for loss loan amounts.  There is also a 1% provision that is made for the balance of the 
loan portfolio which was not reviewed in the past 12 months. One of the criteria, which is critical 
during the analysis and categorisation of loans, is the security that backs the loan. 
 
2.5 Collateral 
Collateral in its simplest definition is a form of security to a lender in case the borrower fails to 
repay a loan. It plays an important role in the financial sector, as it is a means of covering 
potential losses. The Basel Committee (1999) recognizes the importance of collateral and advises 
that the loan classification process should take the ability to realize collateral into consideration.  
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There are many different approaches concerning whether and how collateral should be viewed 
when classifying loans and determining their appropriate provisions (Laurin and Majnoni, 2003). 
All regulatory frameworks do not guarantee the acceptance of some forms of collateral. This 
contributes to the problems in comparing the loan loss provisioning processes across different 
jurisdictions. Once there is acceptance of some form of security, Song (2002) posits that when 
classifying a troubled loan, it is reasonable that a conservative value of the collateral be taken 
into account, instead of just the value of the collateral. This conservative value represents a truer 
picture of the amount that can be recovered, after taking the cost of collection into consideration. 
Jokivuolle and Peura (2003), in an attempt to provide insight into the estimation of the credit risk 
quantity, highlight the sensitivity of using collateral as a source of recovery. For example, if a 
company is unable to meet its debts and goes into default, its assets, which are not high enough 
to cover its liabilities, are usually the same ones that would have been pledged as collateral.  
 
Collateral also plays a major role when making decisions about the amount of provision to be 
made on an impaired loan. The question that arises is whether or not to „net off‟ the collateral 
value against the impaired loan amount before a provision is made. Arguments against „netting 
off‟ refer mainly to deriving the collectible value for collateral. There are difficulties with 
valuing, limited marketability and legal impediments of liquidating collateral. Legal procedures 
are usually prolonged, expensive and may include extra costs for court and sales fees. For these 
reasons, it is believed that collateral values should not be deducted from impaired loan values. 
The case for the inclusion of collateral in the calculation is simpler. If the collateral is liquid, of 
high quality or is a marketed government issued security then it can be easily recovered and 
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appraised. Consequently, only collateral that can be reliably measured are likely to be 
incorporated in the loan provisioning process. 
 
The monitoring of the value of collateral is another issue that banks are expected to grapple with. 
Banks may establish a mechanism periodically to have collateral appraised. Assets that cannot be 
seized, possessed or foreclosed should not be considered capital. Continuously monitoring 
capital could steer a bank clear of tremendous losses in the loan portfolio. As witnessed in the 
early 1990s, neglecting to monitor collateral values may be perilous to financial institutions 
(Song, 2002). 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1  Questionnaires and Interviews 
One of the primary interests of this paper is to ascertain the loan loss provisioning practices of 
commercial banks in Barbados. The key participants interviewed are therefore the employees of 
the banks who are directly involved with or managed the processes of loan loss provisioning. 
Regulatory staff and relationship officers from the Central Bank of Barbados who deal 
specifically with the commercial banks were also interviewed to gain their perspectives of the 
processes.  
 
The questionnaire- available on request- was designed to acquire information from all six 
commercial banks in Barbados during the interview. It is structured similar to the literature 
review and consists of twenty questions within the following sections: the standards that are 
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followed, loan loss provisioning practices including the treatment of collateral and how the 
banks‟ management feel about their levels of provisions and reserves. 
 
3.2  Econometric Models and Data  
Econometric Models 
Finding out how the commercial banks provide for loan losses is important but this does not give 
sufficient information to describe the major determinants of loan loss provisioning in Barbados, 
which is required because provisions and reserves lessen the impact of non-performing loans that 
are sometimes major leading indicators of banking crises. As a result, this paper applied the 
panel dynamic ordinary least squares (PDOLS) methodology proposed by Kao and Chiang 
(2000) and adopted by Mark and Sul (2003)  to estimate regression models aimed at assessing 
the factors that influence loan loss provisioning in Barbados in the short and long run.  PDOLS is 
based on the single equation DOLS procedure pioneered by Saikkonen (1991) and generalized 
by Stock and Watson (1993) and has the following similar features: it allows for the direct 
estimation of a mixture of I(I) and I(0) variables, performs well in small samples and avoids the 
issue of endogeneity.  Further, statistical inference on the parameters of the co-integrating vector 
is facilitated by the fact that the t-statistics of the estimated coefficients have an asymptotic 
normal distribution, even with endogenous regressors (Stock and Watson, 1993).  
 
The application of PDOLS involves three steps.  First, panel unit root tests are employed to 
check the stochastic nature of the variables. The procedures used are due to Levin, Lin and Chu 
(LLC) (2002), and Breitung (2002) [which have a common unit root process as their null 
hypothesis], Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (2002), the Augmented Dickey Fuller - Fisher Chi-
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square (ADF) [whose null assumes individual unit root processes] and the Hadri z-statistic which 
has a null hypothesis of no unit root.  
 
If the variables are non-stationary, the next step is to test for co-integration.  The methods 
employed are the residual based panel and group statistics tests of Kao (1999).  The more 
popular Pedroni (1999) co-integration tests were attempted but the data set lacked enough 
observations for estimation. Finally the short run and long run factors influencing loan loss 
provisioning is determined. 
   
The following long run model is estimated:  
    
1
0 1
k
t t t
i k
LLP X X e   

                                                                          (1) 
where X is a vector of all explanatory variables, X 1  is a subset of I(1) variables of X,   is a 
vector of long –run coefficients and e is a well behaved error term. The leads and lags of the first 
differenced I (1) regressors are included to deal with the problems of endogeneity and 
autocorrelation.  In this paper, the models begins with five leads and lags and  as is customary 
the general to specific methodology is executed in order to obtain a parsimonious representation 
of the regression equations. Therefore, only statistically significant variables are retained in the 
model. 
 
In addition, a general Error Correcting Model was done so that the short run coefficients could 
be obtained. This is given as follows 
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 1
1 1 2 1 3 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 1
( )
t
m m m m
t o t t t t t
i
LLP Y X Z Y X          
   
                      (2) 
Changes in the loan loss provisions on total loans ratio are a function of its past, lagged first 
difference non-stationary variables (X 1 ), lagged stationary variables (Z) and the lagged error 
correcting term.  The short run effects are captured by 
1 2 3, and    while the rate at which loan 
loss provisions readjusts to steady state, after disequilibrium have occurred, is given by . 
  
The independent variables used in this study to explain the natural logarithm of loan loss 
provisions (Lllp) combines variables from Khemraj and Pasha (2009) and Anglomkliew et al 
(2009) and can be broadly categorized into two types: macroeconomic and bank specific.  The 
macroeconomic variables include: the natural logarithm of real gross domestic product (lGdplev) 
which is expected to have a negative association with Lllp. It is anticipated that as the economy 
expands, loan payment defaults are less likely to occur because of increased income, thus, a 
reduced provisioning level based on a person‟s ability to service their debt. lPrices represents the 
logarithm of the Retail Price Index and a positive relationship is expected between this variable 
and Lllp since inflation makes it more expensive to service debts, which may cause the provision 
for defaults to rise. The association between the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate 
(Reer) and Lllp is likely to be positive following the argument that for countries with fixed 
exchange rates and major export industries, it is anticipated that if the currency appreciates those 
local exports would become relatively more expensive when compared to foreign products. This 
implies that since a substantial number of loans go into exporting enterprises that an expected 
appreciation of this variable should have a positive impact on Lllp. 
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With respect to the bank specific variables lEarn represents the logarithm of profits before tax 
and provisions divided by total assets for the individual bank. An ambiguous sign between Lllp 
and earnings is anticipated.  If banks are using provisions to smooth earnings a positive 
relationship is likely. A direct link between the logarithm of total loans divided by total assets of 
the banks (lLoAs) and Lllp is expected. Total loans to total assets describe the amount of credit 
risk. Therefore, if a bank has a high loan to asset ratio it may provide more provisions for the 
credit risk it is undertaking. lSiz is a proxy for the size of the bank and represents the logarithm 
of the bank‟s assets divided by the total assets of all the banks. The a priori sign for this variable 
is ambiguous. It is believed that the sign will be negative if banks are better able to manage 
credit risk efficiently during the credit rationing stage because they have better screening 
processes - due to their size. A positive association is likely between the logarithm of the total 
loans for the banks (ltloans) and Lllp. Rapid credit growth implies higher defaults and by 
extension, the larger the loan portfolio the greater the risk of default. During the interviews, 
commercial bankers said that they use historical default information when making decisions on 
current loan loss provisions. For this reason, a positive relationship is expected between the 
logarithms of non-performing loans to total loans ratio (lNpl1). Higher interest rates imply that 
borrowers should find it harder to service their debt, thus, leading to more defaults and higher 
provisions. In essence, a direct link between (Rir) and Lllp is anticipated. 
 
Data Issues 
The data utilised in this paper cover the quarterly period from 1996 to 2009 and were obtained 
from the Central Bank of Barbados. The dependent variable is loan loss provisions on total loans 
ratio (Lllp) and the independent variables are as follows: real gross domestic product (lGdplev), 
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the Retail Price Index (lPrices), the real effective exchange rate (Reer), profits before tax and 
provisions divided by total assets (lEarn), total loans as a ratio of total assets (lLoAs), the bank‟s 
assets divided by the total assets (lSiz), total loans (ltloans), nonperforming loans divided by total 
loans (lNpl1) and the real interest rate (Rir) given by the total weighted average loan rate minus 
inflation.  The descriptive statistics of the series are shown in Table 1. 
 
Over the period of interest there was one amalgamation and a number of acquisitions. The 
amalgamation occurred in 2002Q4. There was further restructuring of this new venture in 
2006Q1 when one bank increased its share capital by buying a part of the other bank‟s share. As 
a result of this amalgamation and the fact that one bank now prevails the data prior to 2002Q4 
was summed as if this bank existed as it appears today, over the entire study period. Although 
this summation does not truly represent the structure of the banking sector from 1996 to 2002Q3 
it was necessary to maintain a consistent dataset.  
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Lllp lEarn lGdplev lLoAs lPrices lSiz lTloan Reer Rir LNpl1 
 Mean 0.485 -4.880 5.526 3.894 4.732 1.330 12.926 96.561 10.945 1.542 
 Median 0.648 -4.824 5.516 3.993 4.729 2.240 12.966 96.371 10.714 1.511 
 Maximum 3.065 -3.239 5.694 4.323 4.932 3.682 14.299 104.540 12.192 3.830 
 Minimum -1.664 -7.346 5.362 3.112 4.589 -6.397 11.421 88.974 9.642 -16.118 
 Std. Dev. 1.047 0.824 0.085 0.293 0.092 2.756 0.798 4.078 0.783 1.295 
 Skewness -0.070 -0.354 0.130 -0.726 0.318 -1.574 -0.204 0.123 0.040 -7.480 
 Kurtosis 2.253 2.815 2.055 2.321 2.483 3.924 1.867 2.035 1.612 103.932 
 Jarque-Bera 8.077 7.491 13.449 35.942 9.409 150.638 20.290 13.886 27.063 145753 
 Probability 0.018 0.024 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 Sum 163.106 
-
1639.680 1856.654 1308.216 1589.946 446.910 4343.155 32444.64 3677.594 518.179 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 367.479 227.468 2.425 28.689 2.807 2544.865 213.372 5570.053 205.357 562.087 
 Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 
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The first acquisition during the period occurred in 2003Q4 and the second, in 2004. The last one 
came in 2008Q2 but this did not disrupt the data series as separate reporting continued up to the 
end of the review period. All in all this presents a full data set of six banks spanning the entire 
period for the banking system that prevails today.  
Figure 1: Loan Loss Provisions to Total Loans  
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In Barbados, the behaviour of loan loss provisions to total loans ratio is different for each bank 
(Figure 1). For instance, one bank showed a steady decline in this ratio from 1.62% in 1996Q2 to 
its lowest level (0.21%) in 2006Q1 followed by a steady increase to 0.49% at the end of 2009. 
On the other hand, the provisions ratio for another bank was 0.19% at the beginning of 1996 and 
expanded over the next seven years to it maximum of 2.03% in 2003Q2. Subsequent to this, the 
ratio recorded a steady decline during the following four years before it began to rise with the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2007 when it reached 0.70% in 2009Q2.  The main reason for this 
discrepancy in the behaviour of banks is the difference in the credit levels and types of credit 
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issued by each bank. Certain loans within particular industries and sectors have been historically 
proven to be unlikely to default and would carry a lower actual provision. For example, a bank 
with mainly mortgages in its portfolio would have a lower actual provision because people 
seldom default on mortgage payments since they place a high priority on keeping their 
properties. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1 Findings of the Questionnaire and Interviews 
The structure of the loan provisioning process in Barbados is such that the Central Bank 
regulates loan loss provisions by setting minimum levels on a categorical system. The Bank 
provides the commercial banks with the criteria for loan classification and minimal provisioning 
levels. It then conducts credit reviews of the individual bank‟s loan portfolios to ensure 
compliance with the criteria and categories of the Financial Institutions Act (1998). The purpose 
of this Act is to level the playing field across banks and other financial institutions, making 
regulations more enforceable. 
 
An issue that is highlighted by regulators is the discrepancy between required and actual 
provisions. Required provisions are the provisions calculated by the Central Bank of Barbados 
based on their classifications as determined by The Financial Institutions Act 1998 while actual 
provisions reflect the amount that banks set aside to cover losses within their loan portfolios.  
The study asked commercial bankers whether or not they believed that their provision and 
reserve levels were adequate and all responded in the affirmative.  
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From Figure 2 it is observed that there are many small fluctuations in the data as commercial 
banks are constantly adjusting their provisions based on the economic climate and previous loan 
default behaviours. It can also be seen that regulatory provision and actual provision levels move 
very closely together but commercial banks provided more than required by their regulator, the 
Central Bank of Barbados. As of the 2006Q2 there was an upward trend in actual provisions with 
an opposite movement in the level of regulatory provisions for the subsequent four periods. With 
the onset of the financial crisis of 2007, one can recognise that the actual and regulatory 
provisions begin to go in the same direction. What is of greater significance is that these two 
trends vary significantly in the recent period between 2007Q2 and 2009Q4.  The regulatory 
provisions are noticeably lower than the actual provisions because the former are based solely on 
a set percentage of the loans within the different non-performing categories and allows for no 
discretionary influences.  Also, the financial expectations in Barbados were dismal thus, banks 
would have been trying to raise their reserves as the economic climate was and continues to be 
very unstable.  
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Figure 2: Actual verses Required Loan Loss 
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The underlying cause of the discrepancy between regulatory and actual provisions is because 
commercial banks have different internal rating systems for classifying their loans. The 
interviews highlight that commercial banks use the same primary indicator as the Central Bank -
the time past the due date - and incorporate other indicators such as internal credit scores, the 
borrower‟s significant assets, the value and type of collateral as well as other borrower specific 
characteristics. The reason for the difference in classification is that the commercial banks utilize 
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) which do not align perfectly with the Central Bank‟s Regulations on 
provisioning. However, the hierarchy is such that no matter what standards the commercial 
banks decide are best for their personal use, their provisions and reserves must comply with the 
Central Bank‟s regulations. Commercial banks usually employ the IFRS because they are more 
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flexible. This flexibility is desired because it allows the banks to take the current valuation of 
assets and collateral into consideration. On the other hand, under the Central Bank‟s regulation, 
the historical value of the loan is used to estimate the provision.  
 
Due to the differences in the classification ratings for loans, regulators usually face the problem 
of synchronization. They must seek to decide, based on the criteria of the commercial banks‟ 
loan categories, which one(s) match the criteria set out in the regulations. This process is 
necessary in determining which provisioning level is being employed in the calculations and is 
usually well documented by the banks.  
 
In was revealed during the interviews that the provisioning levels in some commercial banks are 
computed using hindsight while in the others only current information is taken into 
consideration. Also, some local banks have no authority in determining their own provision 
levels and take the level passed on by their international head offices. Sometimes, the 
provisioning levels decided by the commercial banks are less than those of the Central Bank and 
have to be corrected by the creation of an additional account.  
 
The primary trigger that commercial banks in Barbados use to determine if a loan is to be 
classified as non-performing is the „time past the due date‟. In addition to timing, there are other 
criteria that can be employed such as the borrower‟s cash flow, the type of collateral and the 
probability of collection of the debt. The amount and purpose of the loan do not impact on the 
level of provision applied to the loan but may become relevant when the decision to issue credit 
is being made.  
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Other important information derived from the interviews are (1) commercial banks in Barbados 
partition their loan loss provisioning into a general provision and a loan specific provision related 
to the individual loan amounts; (2) Central Bank‟s regulations do not consider collateral while 
some banks do; (3) the most common type of securities in Barbados is property - land and houses 
– which are usually valued by third party appraisals but this value is sometimes adjusted by the 
bank‟s management to reflect other characteristics about these securities; and (4) regulatory 
monitoring of commercial banks is of a continuous nature, with reporting to the Central Bank of 
Barbados done on a weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual basis. To supplement these reports, 
officials also conduct on-site inspections to test different key areas of concern which may range 
from grievances with a particular process to the traditional high-risk areas such as capital 
management and credit risks. 
 
4.2 Econometric Results 
The results of the panel unit root tests mentioned above revealed that all the variables, except the 
logarithm of loans to assets ratio (lLoAs), logarithm of operating profit on total assets ratio 
(lEarn) and the logarithm of non-performing loans divided by total loans ratio (lNpl1), are 
integrated of order 1 [I(1)], that is, they need to be differenced once to become stationary (see 
Table 2).  lLoAs, lEarn and lNpl1 are all stationary in levels I(0). 
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Table 2: Panel Stationary Tests 
Variable  Levin, Lin 
& Chu t 
Breitung 
t-stat 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat 
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
Lllp 
Level -1.78997** 2.25073 -1.38674* 16.4544 15.5911 
1st Difference -17.8331*** -6.04304*** -17.4028*** 213.590*** 215.380*** 
lEarn 
Level -3.59849*** -2.43416*** -4.37206*** 51.3037*** 103.556*** 
1st Difference 1.00358 -3.14124*** -10.4063*** 121.558*** 135.691*** 
lprices 
Level 2.84057 0.40571 2.86434 1.51318 2.07558 
1st Difference -15.0916*** 
 
-13.8678*** -13.5521*** 162.483*** 161.502*** 
lLoAs 
Level -.91547*** 
 
 
0.87629 
 
 
-3.02976*** 31.4518*** 
 
30.4265*** 
 
1st Difference -17.4912*** -11.4741*** -16.5494*** 199.925*** 204.049*** 
lTloan 
Level -0.06293 0.52110 3.04777 4.68405 6.32559 
1st Difference -15.5133*** -10.6867*** -13.5692*** 163.121*** 168.525*** 
lgdplev 
Level -2.38532*** -0.44658 -0.72176 10.6070 16.9463 
1st Difference 15.3195 -2.69677** -3.25119*** 29.8734*** 304.050*** 
RIR 
Level 1.43881 -1.49582* 2.34140 2.09488 2.38555 
1st Difference -22.1595*** -17.2348*** -18.3591*** 228.123*** 227.148*** 
lSiz 
Level -1.78875** -3.34322*** -1.73913** 21.5210** 49.6274*** 
1st Difference -14.9972*** -13.1326*** -16.0338*** 195.809*** 247.959*** 
REER 
Level -0.73426 -2.85402*** -2.34624*** 22.2960** 12.0016 
1st Difference -15.4053*** -12.0439*** -12.3879*** 145.579*** 141.504*** 
 Level -3.27370*** -0.08771 -4.70317*** 57.9441*** 58.1823*** 
lNpl1 1st Difference -20.8006*** -8.39757*** -20.9672*** 245.288*** 223.927*** 
Note: *** ** and * are the critical values for the rejection of the null hypothesis of a (common or individual) unit 
root at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All tests were done using an intercept with an automatic selection of 
lags except for the Breitung Common Root Test which utilises an intercept with a trend. Lags were selected 
automatically using Schwarz information criterion. 
 
The long run determinants of the PDOLS model are presented in Equation (3). It is derived from 
a general model and reduced to a parsimonious form using the general to specific methodology a 
la Hendry. The leads and lags are omitted to save space. 
 
*** *** * *** ***
*** *** ***
(9.8285) (-2.8962) (-7.3808) (-5.2328)(1.7218)
(4.6764) (-7.3859)
Lllp=12.88967 - 0.10641 LEarn + 0.10574 1- 0.71419 - 0.46973
            + 0.023564 Re - 0.2151 - 0.65675 P
LNpl LTloan LSiz
er Rir L
(-2.2739)
r ices
(3) 
2R 0.918408   
Note:  t- statistics of regressors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level of testing, respectively. R
2
is the coefficient of determination. The standard errors in brackets are 
heteroskedasticity consistent a la White (1980). 
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Seven significant variables can be found in this long run model and they explained 91.8% of the 
variation in loan loss provisions (Lllp). The operating profit on total loans ratio (lEarn) has an 
adverse relationship with provisions. This result is consistent with Angklomkliew et al (2009) 
and it suggests that the commercial banks in Barbados are not using Lllp to smooth income in the 
long run. The real effective exchange rate (Reer) has a weak positive significant relationship 
with the Lllp, implying that the impact that the real economy has on provision levels is 
minuscule. This was also found to be the case in Pasha and Khemraj (2009).  The level of 
classified debt on total loans (LNpl1) is only significant at the 10% level and has the a priori 
sign, indicating that as the level of classified debt or non-performing loans increases Lllp also 
advance. 
 
The relative market share (lSiz) of commercial banks has an adverse sign with Lllp. This suggests 
that, unlike Guyana (Pasha and Khemraj, 2009), the larger banks in Barbados are more able to 
screen loans through better risk management strategies thus providing a stronger loan portfolio. 
Contrary to the results seen in Jimenez and Saurina (2005) a negative link between provisions 
and the real interest rate (Rir) is observed. The retail price index (LPrices) gives evidence that 
the price level affects Lllp in the long run. However, it should be noted that the a priori sign was 
positive. The parameter on the total number of loans (LTloan) has an adverse sign. This indicates 
that as total loans increases Lllp will decrease. This anomaly between a priori and actual signs 
can be explained if one considers that bigger banks in Barbados are the ones with the largest loan 
portfolios and are better able to screen possible defaults. Hence it is expected that as total loans 
expand then Lllp should contract. 
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The results of the PDOLS error correcting model (ECM) are reported in Equation (4).  
 
*** *** ***
( 3) ( 4)
*** **
( 3)
(4.1007) (2.3817) (1.5618) (-4.8949)
(5.6323) (-2.4593)
Lllp=1.683799 + 0.101463 ( 1 ) + 0.074894 ( 1 ) - 1.20615 d(LTloan) 
            + 0.660077 ( Pr )  - 0.445547 d(LGdplev) + 
d LDep d LDep
d L ices
 

**
( 5)
** *** ** ***
(-3) ( 4) (-1)
(1.6451)
                     (-1.9606) (2.9136)    (-1.7649)     (-4.0764)
0.026876 ( )
            - 0.065133 d(Rir ) + 0.013059 (Re ) - 0.03217 d(lSiz) - 0.129188 ECM
d LEarn
d er


(4) 
2R 0.247186 
 
 
Note:  t- statistics of regressors are shown in parentheses.. ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level of testing, respectively. R
2
is the coefficient of determination. The standard errors in brackets are 
heteroskedasticity consistent a la White (1980). „d‟ represents the first difference operator. 
 
 
The error correcting term in this model is negatively signed, has the a priori magnitude (less than 
one) and is very significant; its coefficient suggests that given an exogenous shock to Lllp it 
returns to equilibrium with 12.9% of the initial shock dissipating in the ensuing quarter. This 
finding for the error correcting term supports the earlier result that the variables cointegrate. 
 
Except for LGdplev and LNpl1 all the other variables are significant in both the long run and 
ECM formulations. In addition, the signs of the parameters in both specifications are similar 
excluding LPrices and LEarn. With respect to the ECM all the variables have the a priori sign 
except for the real interest rate (Rir(-3)) and total loans (LTloan). The variable for total loans has 
a very significant negative relationship with Lllp and suggests that as the loan portfolio grows 
Lllp should decrease. In support of this is the relative market share variable (LSiz) which is 
significant at the 10% level and carries a negative sign, implying that larger banks are better at 
risk management. The gross domestic product (LGdplev) has the expected relationship with Lllp, 
indicating that a one unit rise in LGdplev causes a 44.6% reduction in Lllp. This is consistent 
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with the results obtained in the interviews where bankers state that as incomes increase creditors 
appear better able to service their debt and avoid default.  
 
To shore up the effect of the real economy on loan loss provisions the real effective exchange 
rate from four periods prior (Reer(-4)) is significant and has the expected sign; if it advances by 
one unit a 1.3% change in Lllp in the same direction results. The retail price index from three 
periods before (Lprices(-3)) also proved to have a influential effect on Lllp. As prices expand by 
one unit Lllp are expected to rise by 66% as it would now be harder to service debt. Finally, the 
model suggests that the short run expectation is quite small with a value of 17.36%. The signs 
obtained on these lagged parameters (Lllpt-3 and Lllpt-4) are positive and imply that the higher the 
value of these parameters, the more banks must provide for current Lllp. This persistence in Lllp 
implies that a period of hardship is most likely to be followed by another one until the cycle 
breaks. Information gathered from the interviews found a similar result, namely, that commercial 
banks usually use historical default data along with current and previous business cycle 
information when determining their current levels of provisioning.  
  
5. Conclusion 
This paper examined the components of the loan loss provisions within the banking system of 
Barbados. It combines information acquired through the use of interviews along with data from 
the regulator- The Central Bank of Barbados. The study also used an econometric model to 
explore the main factors which drive loan loss provisions. The results revealed, for the first time 
in Barbados, and possibly regionally, a greater appreciation for the individual procedures of the 
commercial banks as it pertains to loan loss provisioning. Additionally, the paper discovered that 
all of the factors affecting loan loss provisions were significant in both the long run and short 
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run; non-performing loans ratio and real gross domestic product were only significant in the long 
run and the short run, respectively.  
 
This article showcased the persistence of loan loss provisions and revealed how current and 
forecasted economic trends could influence the levels of reserves that provide safety for 
depositors. A heavy dependence of loan loss provisions on the real economy emerged and is 
evidenced in the significant relationships between loan loss provisions and the real effective 
exchange rate, the retail price index and real gross domestic product. This implies that regulators 
and policy makers‟ need to keep abreast of leading economic indicators both locally and 
internationally as competition could influence the level of defaults and, by extension, loan loss 
provisions. 
 
In particular, this research proposes that commercial banks are using loan loss provisions to 
smooth income in the short run. This means that as income falls, profits will decline, and tax 
revenue, which is calculated based on profits, will follow suit. Consequently, it is very important 
for policy makers in Barbados to take the relationship of loan loss provisions and tax revenue 
into consideration.  
 
In addition, evidence from the model suggested that the larger commercial banks were better 
able to screen borrowers to avoid future defaults in both the long and short run, probably, 
through the use of more efficient risk management strategies. 
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One implication of the study is that banks must hold enough reserves to lessen the impact of 
adverse shocks to the economy. It would appear that the shortcomings of the current regulatory 
framework could curtail this development, therefore, considerable groundwork should continue 
to be done to propel the Barbadian Banking System to a better regulatory framework: Basel 
Accord 2.  
 
In Barbados, the current regulatory methods are proving to be successful possibly because there 
are few commercial banks. Their adherence to the reporting regulations and their willingness to 
incorporate the suggestions made by the regulator improves the long standing relationships and 
communication channels between banks and the Central Bank. Therefore, there is normally no 
need to apply any sanctions or penalties. However, there is not sufficient flexibility of regulative 
authority to prevent the major disparity between regulatory and actual provisions during 
undesirable economic times, as evidenced in the recent financial crisis.  
 
In light of this belief, this paper argues that an additional x-factor that could be controlled by the 
Central Bank be included. This would give regulatory staff the much needed flexibility to 
influence the regulated provision and to compensate for the deficiencies in the current historical 
category value method until a better alternative can be fully adapted. 
 
There are also limitations of this study that provide scope for future research. Variables such as 
the loss given default and the probability of default were contemplated but were not included 
because of the large amount of information required to construct appropriate proxies. Also, given 
the importance of the offshore banking sector to Barbados, future work could be directed 
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towards these institutions. Such a study could be aimed at making a comparison of their loan loss 
provisioning practices with the local commercial banks‟.  
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